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I.

INTRODUCTION

In his book about the financial crisis that led to the so-called
“Great Recession,” Michael Lewis tells the story of Michael Burry, a
short-seller who realized that many subprime mortgage bonds were
1
worthless if the inevitable happened—if home prices leveled off.
Home prices did not need to actually fall for the financial meltdown
to occur; they simply needed to level off. Models that valued
subprime home loan-based derivatives did not reveal the extent of the
risk because the models could not account for stable or falling home
prices. Burry assumed that once this information became widespread,
2
the market for these risky derivatives would collapse. To his surprise,
even when the insight was widely shared, the party continued for
years. By then, many individuals and institutions were too heavily
invested in not seeing that the emperor had no clothes to change
3
course before the meltdown began.
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1. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 47–48 (2010) (discussing efforts of Mike Burry
to create a derivative to bet against the subprime mortgage bond market).
2. Id. at 47 (noting Burry’s concern that “[i]t’s going to blow up before I can get this trade
on”). See also Michael J. Burry, I Saw the Crisis Coming. Why Didn’t the Fed?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/opinion/04burry.html.
3. See, e.g., Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Head Stays Bullish on BuyOuts, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VsCLE220 (quoting Citigroup chief executive officer Charles Prince
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We had a reaction similar to Burry’s the first time we read one of
Harvard economist Martin Weitzman’s articles on the failure to
include fat tailed risks in the leading integrated assessment models
4
(IAMs) of climate change costs and benefits. The aspect of climate
change most worthy of substantial attention by anyone interested in
rational risk regulation is the existence of catastrophic, irreversible
5
outcomes. Small shifts in rainfall or temperature may or may not be
worthy of regulatory expenditures, but they do not pose core, longterm threats. Peer-reviewed publications by paleoclimatologists and
climate scientists suggest, however, that there are disturbingly high
likelihoods of temperature increases and sea level rises that could
cause the kinds of systemic failures that almost brought down the
6
financial system in 2008.
Weitzman pointed out as early as 2007 that the state-of-the-art
IAMs did not account for fat-tailed catastrophes. He later formalized
his analysis in his Dismal Theorem, which proved that unlike normal,
for the proposition that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re
still dancing.”).
4. See Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 703, 720 (2007); Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and
Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 2 (2009).
For an early reaction, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Brooke Ackerly & Fred Forster, MicroOffsets and Macro-Transformation: An Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 317–19 (2009).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 43–58 (2007)
(discussing the possibility of abrupt climate change and noting the existence of “a number of
ominous feedback possibilities”); Robert H. Socolow, High-Consequence Outcomes and Internal
Disagreements: Tell Us More, Please, CLIMATIC CHANGE (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1–
2), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/00318p08511j9164/ (stating that “I assume
that Objective Number One for anyone in the policy-making community is to form an
independent judgment of how urgent the climate problem is. Does the world need to drop
everything else and assign climate change the highest priority, or is climate change one of
several important problems?”). The notion that some environmental problems require distinct
responses because they are irreversible is not new to the economics literature. See, e.g., Kenneth
J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88
Q.J. ECON. 312, 318 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Betts et al., When Could Global Warming Reach 4°C?, 369 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, 67, 67 (2011) (predicting a temperature rise of 7°F relative to
preindustrial times by 2060 to 2070); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 795, 1704 (Susan Solomon et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter IPCC PHYSICAL SCIENCE] (concluding that global warming will be
irreversible for thousands of years and carries significant risks of sustained droughts as bad or
worse than the 1930s dust bowl and covering much of the world); Steven C. Sherwood &
Matthew Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate Change Due to Heat Stress, 107 PROC. NAT’L.
ACAD. SCI. 9552, 9552 (2010) (predicting that amounts of warming predicted by several model
simulations could well cause sporadic heat waves affecting large fractions of the populated areas
of the planet that would kill anyone without access to air conditioning).
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thin-tailed risks, the fat tails of uncertainty about the consequences of
climate change cause the expected damages to be dominated by lowprobability catastrophes: “The economics of fat-tailed catastrophes
raises difficult conceptual issues that cause the analysis to appear less
scientifically conclusive and more contentiously subjective than what
comes out of an empirical CBA [cost–benefit analysis] of more thintailed situations. But if this is the way things are with fat tails, then
this is the way things are. . . . . Perhaps in the end the climate-change
economist can help most by not presenting a cost-benefit estimate . . .
7
as if it is accurate and objective.” In the last several years, legal
scholars have begun to examine the implications of Weitzman’s
8
concerns for climate change laws and policies.
In addition, it has become increasingly apparent that tipping
points may well exist, points beyond which catastrophic outcomes will
be difficult if not impossible to prevent. For example, a recent expert
elicitation study suggests that there is a greater than fifty percent
probability that the earth’s climate system will cross an irreversible
tipping point by the year 2100 if we continue on a business-as-usual
9
trajectory. The tipping points discussed in these studies do not refer

7. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting, supra note 4, at 18. See also Jonathan S.
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis 32–33
(John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 525, 2010), available at http://
www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/525-315-jm-eap-climate.pdf (noting that quantitative costbenefit analysis is of little if any use in managing climate change risks because of both the
enormous scientific uncertainties and the inseparability of scientific questions from normative
or political ones).
8. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1521, 1554 (2009) (discussing treatment of fat-tailed risks in IAMs);
Vandenbergh, Ackerly & Forster, supra note 4, at 317–19 (examining implications of fat-tailed
risks for climate policy); Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that IAMs may be
“underestimating the probability of catastrophic events by significant margins”); Daniel A.
Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 923–27 (2011) (discussing fat-tailed distributions and
catastrophic outcomes). See also Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, A Reply, 41 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,726, 10,728 (2011) (noting that IAMs “systematically understate the economic effects of
climate change” because of their omission of several categories of harm, including catastrophic
events).
9. Kirsten Zickfeld et al., Expert Judgments about Transient Climate Response to
Alternative Future Trajectories of Radiative Forcing, 107 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 12,451,
12,452–53 (2010) (reporting that thirteen of fourteen experts assigned a probability greater than
0.5 to the climate system undergoing or becoming irrevocably committed to “a fundamental
state change” by 2100 under a high-emissions scenario similar to the historically observed
trajectory, with nine of the fourteen assigning a probability greater than ninety percent; eight of
the fourteen assigned a probability greater than fifty percent even for a “medium” trajectory, in
which drastic emissions curtailment would stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 550 parts per million by
2100). See also Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment of Tipping Points in the
Climate System, 106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 5041, 5041 (2009) (reporting “conservative lower
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specifically to catastrophes large enough to end civilization, but they
do represent significant, abrupt, and irreversible changes in the
climate system that would have dramatic global impacts. In addition,
greenhouse gas emissions over the next several decades may make it
impossible to avoid some tipping points, even if emissions are
10
dramatically curtailed in subsequent years. Although most tipping
points discussed in the literature may not lead to catastrophic harms,
there is no method to rigorously determine CO2 concentrations
corresponding to tipping points, and classes of tipping points may
exist that have not yet been identified in the scientific literature. The
problem is not one of known thresholds for catastrophic harm, but
one of uncertainty and ignorance surrounding a real but
indeterminate possibility for irreversible global catastrophe.
We believe that reducing the likelihood of truly catastrophic
outcomes should be a central goal of any system designed to achieve
rational risk management. That may appear to be an obvious
proposition, but as we will discuss, the risk-assessment and riskmanagement communities are not functioning as if that is the central
goal. We also believe that the existence of unknown but plausible
tipping points supports a sense of urgency regarding risk assessment
and risk management.
We might have expected a rational risk-management system to
respond to the Weitzman analysis with an effort to find better ways to
treat fat-tailed uncertainty about catastrophic risks and to introduce
those new assessments into regulatory analysis and policy debates
about climate change. The growing concern about tipping points
might have induced the risk-management system to move quickly to
incorporate these fat-tailed risks into the analysis. The response could
have involved modifying traditional cost–benefit techniques to
account for these outcomes. It could have involved supplementing or
replacing cost–benefit analysis of climate change with other
bounds for the probability of triggering at least 1 [tipping point event] of . . . 0.56 for high global
mean temperature change (above 4 °C) relative to year 2000 levels”).
10. Johan Rockstrom et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472, 473
(2009) (noting that a number of tipping points probably lie within the range of 350 to 550 parts
per million of CO2; the current concentration of CO2 is roughly 390 parts per million);
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 222 fig.3.12 (John T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001), and supplementary
online
data
at http://www.ipcc-data.org/ancilliary/tar-bern.txt
and http://www.ipccdata.org/ancilliary/tar-isam.txt (showing that three of the six major emissions scenarios produce
CO2 concentrations of 550 ppm or more by 2060). See also Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping
Points in the Earth’s Climate System, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1786, 1788 (2008) (providing
detailed tipping point assessment).
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techniques that account for these outcomes and are likely to carry
appropriate weight in regulatory and policy decision-making. Or, at a
minimum, it could have included prominent, full disclosure of the
limitations of the analysis in ways likely to affect the policy debate.
Unfortunately, that did not happen. The response to Weitzman’s
analysis bears an uncanny resemblance to the response of financial
institutions to unwanted information about the risks of mortgagebacked securities. Some criticized the points made by Weitzman and
other critics of climate cost–benefit analysis as just a rehash of
previous arguments over precautionary versus cost–benefit
11
approaches to environmental policy. Others faulted Weitzman for
placing too high a value on preventing the permanent destruction of
12
civilization. Others acknowledged the limited treatment of tail risks
but only conducted limited additional sensitivity analyses or argued
that the catastrophic tail of the climate risk distribution was not
13
nearly as fat as Weitzman had presumed.

11. See, e.g., Gary W. Yohe & Richard S.J. Tol, Precaution and the Dismal Theorem:
Implications for Climate Policy and Climate Research (Working Paper FNU-145, Sustainability
& Global Change Research Unit, Hamburg Univ., 2007), available at http://
econpapers.repec.org/paper/sgcwpaper/145.htm (arguing that if the Dismal Theorem implies an
extremely precautionary policy response to fat-tailed risks, then there is no way to set priorities
among multiple fat-tailed risks, but also sharing this Article’s conclusion that the Dismal
Theorem does imply an urgent need to develop better ways of understanding and rationally
treating fat-tailed macro risks).
12. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Fat Tails, Thin Tails, and Climate Change Policy 4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16353, 2010) (arguing that if the extinction of
the human race, including “the end for future generations” is valued at a large but finite
multiple of the value of statistical life, “the dismal theorem no longer holds”); William D.
Nordhaus, An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem 6–7, 12–14 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No.
1686, 2009) (analyzing other examples of potential catastrophes and concluding that “societies
do not behave as if catastrophic outcomes have unbounded negative disutility”). But see Martin
Weitzman, Reactions to the Nordhaus Critique 8–14 (Harvard Envtl. Econ. Program Discussion
Paper No. 09-11, 2009) (arguing that replacing the infinite value of the value of civilization or
the human race with “an uncomfortably large, but finite number” does not remove the Dismal
Theorem’s conclusion that for fat-tailed risks, rational willingness to pay will be dominated by
low-probability catastrophes even when “the most catastrophic extremes are unlikely ever to
materialize”).
13. See, e.g., Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 8–12 (criticizing Weitzman’s method of calculating
tail risk). But see Weitzman, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that “[c]ontrary to what Nordhaus
states, my article relied on three recent peer-reviewed scientific studies to estimate roughly the
PDF [probability density function] of S2”). See also Christopher J. Costello et al., Bounded
Uncertainty and Climate Change Economics, 107 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI 8108, 8109 (2010)
(noting that if the damage from a given temperature rise is close to the range reported by IPCC,
then truncating the fat tails of the risk distribution resolves many of the problems Weitzman’s
Dismal Theorem introduces for cost-benefit analysis, but with the caveat that “if the
consumption loss caused by warming increases much more rapidly with temperature, this result
could be overturned”).
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When responding to critics of cost–benefit analysis more
generally, some have pointed out that cost–benefit analysis is just one
14
tool to inform policymakers. They are certainly correct on that
point, but it is important to account for the impact on the policy
debate of having one dominant tool that is used for major federal
15
rulemaking and that generates a hard, quantitative outcome. When
weighed against the results of any non-mandatory, qualitative
approach, the effects on the policy development and the surrounding
debate are predictable.
Perhaps the best example of the impacts of IAMs on policy
development is the focus on identifying a range of social costs of
16
carbon. This leads to policies based on IAMs that largely neglect fat17
tailed risks, and the result is a range of social costs of carbon ranging
in 2010 from roughly five to thirty-five dollars per ton of carbon
dioxide, with a central point estimate of twenty-one dollars per ton.
Federal agencies are to use social costs of carbon within this range in
regulatory decision-making. This range is entirely on-target so long as
we ignore the principal aspect of climate change that should concern
us the most: low probability, irreversible, catastrophic outcomes. The
unsurprising result of an analysis that ignores fat-tailed risks is that a
low relative priority is given to reducing catastrophic climate risks as
18
compared to other societal risks. Thus the numbers generated by
this very precise assessment fail a basic plausibility assessment: they
are derived from IAMs that largely ignore the precise types of

14. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 111 (2002) (stating that “[t]he quantitative description should supplement rather
than displace a qualitative description of relevant effects. . . . Agencies should be permitted to
make adjustments . . . on the basis of the various ‘qualitative’ factors”).
15. Sheila Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society, in ACCEPTABLE
EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 29, 44 (Deborah G. Mayo &
Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) (noting that “[r]educing scientific uncertainty to
mathematical terms offers decision makers a means of rationalizing actions that might otherwise
seem insupportably arbitrary and subjective. . . . Numerical assessments possess a kind of
symbolic neutrality that is rarely attained by qualitative formulations”).
16. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric
Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,909–12 (Mar. 9, 2010); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINAL RULE
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (TSD): ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM FOR COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT, at app. 15A (2010) (including “Social Cost of Carbon for
Regulatory Impact
Analysis
Under
Executive
Order
12866”),
available
at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/commercial/sem_finalrule_tsd.html.
17. See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 4.
18. See Freeman & Guzman, supra note 8, at 1594. See also Ryan Lizza, As the World
Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/
101011fa_fact_lizza.
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outcomes that should be first on the agenda of a rational risk
19
regulator.
The assessment of climate change risks also raises a broader issue
that is fundamental to understanding EPA at forty and to improving
environmental regulatory activity over the next forty years. In this
Essay, we argue that, if environmental policymaking is to succeed in
its second forty years, present concerns about climate risk assessment
suggest a broader need to improve assessment and decision-making
regarding what we call macro-risks. Our analysis suggests not only a
need to focus more on macro-risks, but also a need for the macro-risk
assessment process to be driven more by the nature of the risk and
less by the capabilities of traditional risk assessment techniques—
which were honed on micro-risk analysis but face serious
shortcomings when applied to macro-risks. We suggest that a new
focus is necessary if rational risk regulation is to occur regarding
macro-risks, and if cost–benefit analysis is to maintain its hold on
environmental policymaking across administrations and partisan lines
as the climate problem becomes more evident.
We begin by distinguishing macro- and micro-risks and by
describing why catastrophic climate change represents a largely
unaccounted-for macro-risk. We believe that climate concerns will
dominate the risk issues addressed by environmental policymaking
over the next forty years, and we focus on climate change here, but
we believe the analysis is relevant to resource allocation across a wide
range of social risks—including global pandemics, nuclear war, and
asteroid impacts. We then suggest shifts in methodology and
institutional arrangements to improve the prospects for rational risk
regulation regarding macro-risks. No easy remedies exist, but we
suggest several viable steps to enhance the prospects for rational
macro-risk regulation.

19. See Jasanoff, supra note 15, at 44–45 (stating that “quantitative risk assessment is far
less an independent decision technique than a surrogate for deeper political divergences that
choose . . . to express themselves as disputes about evidence. . . . The ultimate decision maker
will still be confronted with the problem of cutting the knot of uncertainty, and it is by no means
clear that better quantitative characterizations of the range of political choice will enhance the
legitimacy of the final decision”).
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II. MACRO-RISKS V. MICRO-RISKS
A. Micro-Risk Regulation
Since the founding of EPA, the risk regulation movement has
made substantial progress regarding rational regulation of microrisks. By micro-risks, we mean the type of subject matter that is
typically addressed by any one rulemaking, even a major rulemaking
with $100 million or greater economic impact. Rulemakings and other
policy initiatives addressing micro-risks often address very important
issues—the health effects of hazardous air pollutants in industrial air
emissions, maximum contaminant levels in drinking water, effluent
limitations for pollutant discharges to navigable waters—but failure
to optimally manage these risks, even failure to address them at all,
will not result in threats to the social fabric or long-term sustainability
of the nation or globe. In addition, although uncertainties about costs
and benefits often exist for micro-risks, micro-risk decisions are not
dominated by uncertainties about extremely unlikely events.
In the last three decades, the legal authorities supporting White
House oversight of the cost–benefit analysis process have become
20
increasingly clear. In addition, the techniques have become
increasingly sophisticated for analysis of the costs and benefits of
21
regulations addressing micro-risks. Although important debates still
exist about discount rates, the valuation of non-market amenities, the
role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and other
22
issues, micro-risk analysis has survived and expanded. Over the last
several decades, cost–benefit analysis has garnered the support of
23
many centrist social welfarists, and the result has been the
continuation of its use in White House review of regulations in both
24
Republican and Democratic administrations.
20. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., id.; Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1355, 1379–96 (2009).
23. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR
HEALTH (2008); SUNSTEIN, supra note 14; W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 153–59 (1992) (noting that risk information risk increases
regulations’ effectiveness); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Resolving Risk
Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK 226 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
24. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) with Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735. 51,742 § 6(a)(C)(iii) (1993) (requiring that agencies “assess both the
costs and the benefits of the intended regulation”). For a review of EPA officials’ perspectives
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Since quantitative White House analysis of the costs and benefits
of environmental regulations began in the late 1970s, however,
environmentalists have cast a wary eye on the process. Is it being used
to improve net social welfare by directing regulatory resources
toward the most important environmental problems? Or is it simply
being used to reduce the burden on regulatory targets, even if that
25
means a net loss in welfare? This is more than a theoretical question.
Over the long term, the answer will determine whether the large
number of policymakers and scholars who care about the
environment but are not environmental advocates support the use of
cost–benefit analysis. If it is a tool to provide more rational risk
regulation, it is likely to continue to gather widespread support, and
kinks or inadequacies can be worked out along the way. If it is simply
a tool for reducing the costs imposed on regulated industries, then its
support narrows to a smaller, more ideologically-driven base, and its
function is much more difficult for non-aligned social welfarists to
defend.
B. Macro-Risk Regulation
We suggest that macro-risks pose a challenge to the continued
viability of cost-benefit analysis as a central component of rational
risk regulation. By macro-risks, we mean those risks that have the
potential to dramatically disrupt the character of markets and
economies on a global scale and for very long times. Climate change
is the leading example. Other macro-risks that pose similar problems
for policymakers include global pandemics, nuclear war, and asteroid
impacts, and we believe these problems can benefit from the kinds of
26
macro-risk analysis that we outline here for climate change. Our
concept of macro-risks is comparable to the term “megacatastrophe,” which Kousky and her colleagues characterize as having
severe impacts covering a large fraction of the planet, irreversibility in
practical terms on timescales relevant to policymaking, and significant

on White House oversight of EPA regulatory development across administrations, see Lisa
Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at
the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Press Statement, Office of the President, Statement of the President on the
Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambientair-quality-standards (requesting EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to withdraw a Clean Air Act
ozone standard and noting “the importance of reducing regulatory burdens and regulatory
uncertainty” without discussing the net effects of the proposed ozone standard).
26. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5 (examining potential catastrophic risks).
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uncertainty not only in the sense of probabilities associated with
specific hazards, but also in the sense of ignorance of the full list of
hazards to assess. Because these mega-catastrophes violate the
conditions for insurance markets to function and because they take
place on scales of time and space that exceed even governments’
ability to spread risk, Kousky and her colleagues conclude that
“[t]raditional responses to the risk of extreme events are of limited
27
value in mitigating risks.” Thus, a rational-choice framework for
28
managing these risks requires a new approach.
Unfortunately, much less progress has been made regarding
assessment of macro-risks compared to assessment of micro-risks,
even though the former are inarguably more important than the
latter. Cost–benefit analysis for risk management generally assumes,
either implicitly or explicitly, that markets continue to function and to
29
equilibrate, so welfare theorems are satisfied. Micro-risks can indeed
be treated as small perturbations to an equilibrium economy: markets
adjust to the perturbations, a new equilibrium is established, and the
social welfare at the new perturbed equilibrium can be compared to
the welfare at the previous unperturbed equilibrium. The disruption
may increase or decrease the total welfare and may alter its
distribution, but this leaves the overall economy sufficiently similar to
its previous state that comparisons are useful and meaningful.
Moreover, when the second welfare theorem applies, these
perturbations are reversible: after removing the perturbation—and
perhaps enacting a one-time transfer of assets—the market can return
things to the status quo ante.
Macro-risks are entirely different, and conventional cost–benefit
analysis breaks down when it attempts to treat them in this manner
because they may leave the economy so unlike its previous state that
quantitative comparisons of utility cease to be good descriptors of the
change. A distinctive characteristic of macro-risks is that the expected
value of regulation becomes extremely sensitive to which
mathematical treatment is chosen to represent scientific uncertainty

27. Carolyn Kousky et al., Responding to Threats of Climate Change Mega-Catastrophes 2–
3 (Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP10-008, 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507992.
28. See Weitzman, supra note 12, at 8–14 (noting the limits of traditional cost-benefit
analysis).
29. FRANK ACKERMAN, CAN WE AFFORD THE FUTURE? 8–12 (2009).
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30

about extremely unlikely global catastrophes. When this uncertainty
is bounded or modeled with thin tails, the expected utility is
dominated by reasonably foreseeable micro-risks. Conversely, when
the uncertainty has fat tails, expected utility is dominated by unlikely
events that are poorly understood and difficult or impossible to treat
rigorously. Global climate change is the paradigmatic macro-risk: its
tail risks threaten not just to perturb markets but to disrupt them
entirely. The effects of climate change are expected to be irreversible
for thousands of years; because the magnitude of the damages in the
tail of the risk distribution are large on the scale of the entire global
economy and threaten death tolls that are large on the scale of the
world population, they cannot be treated as small perturbations to a
system in equilibrium. These large changes violate several
assumptions of cost–benefit models based on marginal analysis of
quasi-equilibrium conditions: Costs and benefits may be
discontinuous and path dependent, so marginal costs and benefits
may not, in fact, be well-defined but may become infinite and may
31
take on multiple values depending on the history that led to them.
Rather, since they threaten to disrupt the markets themselves and to
dramatically change the conditions and constraints of people’s lives
32
around the world, we need a very different way to think about them.
Moreover, even a very small risk that there are tipping points,
especially ones that could set off uncontrollable runaway warming,
poses a great challenge to policies of waiting for greater certainty
before undertaking expensive precautionary measures. In the words
of an early and influential assessment of uncertainties about climate
change, “[a] wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too
33
late.”

30. See Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting, supra note 4. But see Costello et al.,
supra note 13.
31. Terry Barker, The Economics of Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, 89 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 173, 182–84, 188–89 (2008).
32. IPCC PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 775–77, 822–31 (noting irreversible aspects
of climate change); Sherwood & Huber, supra note 6, at 9554 (discussing death tolls);
Weitzman, Stern Review, supra note 4 (noting the scale of economic costs); Weitzman, supra
note 12, at 2 (noting that standard cost-benefit analysis is not very useful in guiding policy under
these circumstances). In illustrating the shortcomings of traditional cost-benefit analysis at
assessing macro-risks, Jaeger et al. point out that the horrors of World War I and World War II
are not apparent in graphs of gross world product. Carlo Jaeger et al., Stern’s Review and
Adam’s Fallacy, 89 CLIMATIC CHANGE 207, 208–209 (2008).
33. JULE G. CHARNEY ET AL., CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT, at viii (1979), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12181.
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Even strong proponents of cost–benefit analysis acknowledge the
difficulty of applying it to this sort of macro-risk. Richard Posner
writes that “global warming seems like the poster child for the
34
limitations of cost–benefit analysis.” William Nordhaus writes that,
“[i]f global warming is the mother of all public goods, it may also be
the father of decision-making under uncertainty,” and in his
integrated assessment model, “every equation . . . contains major
35
unresolved questions.” Richard Tol points out that if catastrophic
climate change produces negative economic growth, this leads to
mathematical absurdities—infinite variance in the social cost of
36
carbon—that can render a cost–benefit analysis meaningless.
Nordhaus writes that his integrated assessment model
“analyz[es] the economics of global warming under the assumption of
perfect foresight or certainty” while acknowledging that “studies by
[him] and others provide inconsistent results about the impacts of
uncertainty.” Yet he concludes that “the certainty-equivalent policy is
37
very close to the policy [accounting for] a full range of uncertainty.”
This is true for uncertainties in the central part of a normal
probability distribution, but for extreme risks and fat tails, things may
break down, and different (and arguably more realistic) choices for
some of Nordhaus’s parameters lead to very different results, with
optimal emissions mitigation trajectories that entail rapid emissions
38
reduction over a few decades. This contrasts with Nordhaus’s results,
34. POSNER, supra note 5, at 155.
35. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE 62 (2008).
36. See Richard S.J. Tol, Is the Uncertainty About Climate Change Too Large for Expected
Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 56 CLIMATIC CHANGE 265, 277–80 (2003) (noting that if economic
growth becomes negative, even in some regions of the planet, the IAM results produce infinite
uncertainty in the social cost of carbon, even for finite damages). See also Richard S.J. Tol &
Gary W. Yohe, Infinite Uncertainty, Forgotten Feedbacks, and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate
Policy, 83 CLIMATIC CHANGE 429, 440–41 (2007) (noting that adding a second policy lever,
international development aid, can remedy the infinite uncertainty, but that this lever is not
robust).
37. NORDHAUS, supra note 35, at 63.
38. See Frank Ackerman et al., Fat Tails, Exponents, Extreme Uncertainty: Simulating
Catastrophe in DICE, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1657, 1660, 1664 (2010) (noting that Nordhaus
provides “no clear explanation for the crucial assumption that” damages from global warming
are proportional to the square of the temperature rise, and that if damages are proportional to
the fourth or fifth power of temperature rise, an optimal policy would lead to complete
abatement of carbon emissions in 30 to 100 years). See also Elizabeth A. Stanton et al., Inside
the Integrated Assessment Models: Four Issues in Climate Economics, 1 CLIMATE &
DEVELOPMENT 166, 172 (2009) (“DICE, like a number of other models, assumes that . . .
damages are a quadratic function of the temperature change. . . . Our review of the literature
uncovered no rationale, whether empirical or theoretical, for adopting a quadratic form for the
damage function. . . . Sensitivity analyses of the Stern Review . . . show that fixing the exponent

Vandenbergh_122211 (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2011]

12/22/2011 1:41 PM

MACRO-RISKS

413

in which optimum trajectories gradually reduce emissions over the
39
course of two centuries.
Nordhaus acknowledges Weitzman’s and Tol’s fears about tail
risks disrupting the entire economy, but he dismisses these concerns
because his own model does not produce these catastrophic
40
outcomes. This dismissal is surprising given that Nordhaus
acknowledges the limits of such models: “We emphasize . . . that
models such as the present one have limited utility in looking at the
41
potential for catastrophic events.” Nordhaus goes on to defend the
use of IAMs despite these shortcomings, writing that “fears about
low-probability outcomes in the distant future should not impede . . .
steps to deal with the high probability dangers that are on us today.
We should start with the clear and present dangers, after which we
42
can turn to the unclear and distant threats.”
For many micro-risks, this may be a sound approach. However,
IAMs that do not account fully for the combination of catastrophic
outcomes and tipping points may affect the sense of urgency and
priority among the public and policymakers regarding climate
mitigation. If the IAMs contribute to a go-slow approach, and if our
inaction over the next several decades allows atmospheric carbon
concentrations to cross any of several tipping points, the go-slow
approach may commit us to a trajectory that could lead to
catastrophe. Certainly if we exclude the possibility of truly
catastrophic outcomes and tipping points, a go-slow approach is the
most rational. But, as we note at the outset, climate scientists have
identified a number of potential tipping points in the climate system
that could be crossed while the slow policy ramp is implemented, and
the risk assessment process has not induced the public or
policymakers to grasp the implicit risks of the go-slow approach or
the magnitude of the consequences for guessing incorrectly about tail
risks. The climate science suggests that the possibility of catastrophe
is quite real, and, to the extent the likelihood can be quantified, it
exists at levels that none of us would accept for getting on an airplane
at 3—assuming that the damages are a cubic function of the temperature—increases average
annual damages across the 200 year forecast horizon . . . by a remarkable 23% of world output.
Thus the equally arbitrary assumption that damages are a cubic, rather than quadratic, function
of temperature would have a large effect on IAM results, and consequently on their policy
implications” (citations omitted)).
39. See NORDHAUS, supra note 35, 146–47.
40. Id. at 146–47.
41. Id. at 147.
42. Id.

Vandenbergh_122211 (Do Not Delete)

414

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

12/22/2011 1:41 PM

[Vol. 21:401

or driving a car, much less managing the ability of the planet to
43
sustain billions of people for hundreds or thousands of years.
Furthermore, concerns about severe climate harms are not just
44
the pipe dreams of catastrophists. We discuss here just three of the
numerous examples of plausible catastrophic outcomes that do not
appear to be accounted for in the leading IAMs. Additional examples
can be found in a number of the most highly regarded, peer-reviewed
45
scientific journals and books.
Extreme Heat Waves. Our first example was identified in a recent
paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences by Sherwood and Huber. The paper examines the effects of
climate change 300 years from now, asking what regions on earth
would be too hot and humid for humans to survive outdoors even
under optimal conditions— that is, naked, soaking wet, and with high
46
winds to cool them. The implications of the paper are stark and are
hard to square with an analysis whose high-end damages are roughly
ten percent of gross domestic product (GDP). For seven degrees
Celsius of average warming, some currently inhabited regions of the
planet would experience sporadic heat waves that would kill anyone
caught outside or without access to air conditioning within hours. For
eleven to twelve degrees Celsius average warming, these kill zones
would expand to include most places currently inhabited by people.
These heat waves would not come every year, but when they did, life
would be possible in those places only by remaining indoors with air
conditioning at all times.
What is the probability that the planet will heat up eleven
degrees or more? If we continue along the higher end of plausible
business-as-usual emissions paths, atmospheric CO2 could reach four
times its preindustrial level over the next century or so. Several recent

43. See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 5
tbl.1 (2008) (providing table with likelihoods of temperature increases over two degrees C
above pre-industrial levels).
44. For a discussion of how the likelihood of a climate catastrophe has affected a leading
climate scientist, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Catastrophist, NEW YORKER, June 29, 2009, at 39.
45. See, e.g., AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE (Hans J. Schellnhuber et al. eds.,
2006); V. Ramanathan, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate
System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14245 (2008); Joel B. Smith
et al., Assessing Dangerous Climate Change Through an Update of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) “Reasons for Concern,” 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4133 (2009).
46. Sherwood & Huber, supra note 6, at 9552 (concluding that “recent estimates of the
costs of unmitigated climate change are too low unless the range of possible warming can
somehow be narrowed”).
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analyses estimate that there is at least a five percent probability that
47
the climate sensitivity is greater than six degrees Celsius. If that is
correct, quadrupling CO2 could raise temperatures by more than
twelve degrees Celsius. Even if we take these model results with a
grain of salt, supposing that there’s a ninety-five percent chance they
are grossly wrong about the probability of a six degree climate
sensitivity or the consequences of eleven degree warming, that leaves
more than a one-in-four-hundred probability—five percent chance
that the papers are right times a five percent chance that the
sensitivity is greater than 6 degrees—that most currently inhabited
areas will experience occasional heat waves deadlier than anything in
recorded history. If these heat waves occur on average once every ten
years in any region, the average annual death toll among the world’s
48
poor would be hundreds of millions.
Global Food Shortages. Another macro-risk associated with
climate change is the breakdown of the world’s food supply. If
drought, extreme heat, or severe weather causes a catastrophic loss of
a single nation’s agricultural output for a year or two, global trade can
respond to supply food to the stricken nation. Moreover, in a world of
plenty where surpluses are taken for granted, food is cheap and
agriculture is a small part of the GDP of developed nations, so the
potential impacts of climate change on food production seem very
small using today’s marginal elasticities. If climate change produces a
chain of crop failures across many nations, however, the disruptions—
whether we measure them in dollars or lives lost—could well be far

47. Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global
Warming to 2°C, 458 NATURE 1158, 1158 (2009) (estimating a 5% probability of a sensitivity
greater than 7°C); N.G. Andronova & M.E. Schlessinger, Objective Estimation of the Probability
Density Function for Climate Sensitivity, 106 J. GEOPHYS. RES. ATMOSPHERES 22,605, 22,605
(2001); Reto Knutti et al., Constraints on Radiative Forcing and Future Climate Change from
Observations and Climate Model Ensembles, 416 NATURE 719, 719 (2002); J.M. Gregory et al.,
An Observationally Based Estimate of the Climate Sensitivity, 15 J. CLIMATE 3117, 3117 (2002);
G.H. Roe & M.B. Baker, Why is Climate so Unpredictable, 318 SCIENCE 629, 630 fig.2 (2007).
But see J.D. Annan & J.C. Hargreaves, Using Multiple Observationally-Based Constraints to
Estimate Climate Sensitivity, 33 GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. L06704, L06704 (2006) (assigning a 5%
probability that climate sensitivity exceeds 4.5°C, with negligible probability that it exceeds
6°C).
48. In the absence of the development and global deployment of some remarkable new
energy technology, attempting to remedy this by providing air conditioning to everyone on
earth would create a deadly race as a burgeoning coal-powered electrical generation
infrastructure hastens the arrival of the heat waves against which it is intended to protect.
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greater than would be predicted by multiplying crop losses by current
49
market prices.
Quantitatively assessing the probability and magnitude of
widespread crop failures around the planet is not possible with any
degree of certainty. Rising temperatures have both beneficial and
harmful effects on crop yields. Carbon dioxide fertilization may or
may not offset a large part of the anticipated heat and water stress.
Farmers can adapt to changing climate, both by changing planting
times and crop choices and also by adopting more expensive
technology in the fields. The interactions of all these factors produces
great uncertainty and estimates of the impact of climate change on
global food production reported in one recent review range from a
50
one percent gain to a twenty percent loss. These estimates
understate the fat tail on the high-risk side of the distribution,
however, because they do not account for higher-than-expected
climate sensitivity; extreme weather events, including heat waves,
heavy precipitation, severe storms, and so on; indirect effects of
climate change on air quality, pests, and disease; sea-level rise, which
would particularly affect rice production; and reductions in grain
quality.
To understand the potential vulnerability in the agricultural
sector, consider the so-called Medieval Warm Period, between about
900 and 1400 C.E. Temperatures in what is now the contiguous
United States were slightly warmer than today, and the region
suffered a sequence of mega-droughts of much greater severity than
the Dust Bowl drought of the 1930s, which lasted between 40 and 240
51
years. Solomon and her colleagues report good agreement among
different climate models that recurring droughts of similar or greater
severity—up to three times as severe as the Dust Bowl—are expected
in many parts of the world if greenhouse gas emissions are not sharply
curtailed, and these patterns of recurring droughts would be
52
irreversible for thousands of years. Even with all the improvements
to agriculture that modern technology has provided, such droughts
49. Kousky et al., supra note 27, at 6–7 (describing the way multiple local disasters could
cascade to rapidly create a global mega-catastrophe).
50. David B. Lobell, Global Crop Production and Food Security, in CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE AND POLICY 113, 115 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2010).
51. See Edward Cook et al., Megadroughts in North America: Placing IPCC Projections of
Hydroclimatic Change in a Long-Term Paleoclimate Context, 25 J. QUATERNARY SCI. 48, 55,
57–59 (2010).
52. Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions,
106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1706–07 (2009).
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would be devastating, and recent research comparing past climates to
model calculations adds strength to the predictions that global
53
warming could very well produce similar droughts. In many
countries, including the U.S., India, and China, major aquifers are
being rapidly depleted, so coping with drought by irrigating with
54
groundwater will become increasingly difficult.
As population growth stresses the ability of many Asian nations,
such as India, China, and Bangladesh, to feed their people, trade is
accelerating with African nations for food and other agricultural
55
products, such as biofuels and raw materials for industry. Several
strategically important oil states are also looking to sub-Saharan
Africa as major food suppliers. Acquisitions of farmland by outsiders
56
can exacerbate political instability. As complex interactions between
agriculture, economic development, trade, shifting alliances, and the
internal political dynamics of vulnerable nations respond to stresses
from climate change, the repercussions are unpredictable and
potentially global. Robert D. Kaplan has argued that climatic stress
has the potential to act as a tipping point in countries, such as
Bangladesh, that are currently peaceful, but could both tip into
57
internal violence and spark broader regional or global conflict.
Ocean Acidification. A third type of macro-risk is ocean
acidification. Quite separately from its climatic effects as a
53. Cook et al., supra note 51, at 58–59; Peter J. Fawcett et al., Extended Megadroughts in
the Southwestern United States During Pleistocene Interglacials, 470 NATURE 518, 520 (2011). It
is not possible to predict mega-droughts with confidence, but recent research confirms that such
mega-droughts did take place during the warmest parts of the interglacial periods of the last
half-million years, as computer model calculations had indicated. This agreement between
theory and observation adds credibility to those same models’ predictions that such droughts
are a likely consequence of anthropogenic global warming.
54. SANDRA POSTEL, PILLAR OF SAND: CAN THE IRRIGATION MIRACLE LAST 6 (1999).
55. See, e.g., Scott Baldauf, Hunger and Food Security: Is Africa Selling the Farm?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/
2011/0206/Hunger-and-food-security-Is-Africa-selling-the-farm.
56. Id. Crop failures in Africa could intensify local conflicts between exporting food and
consuming it domestically and also create international conflicts as importing nations treat
failure to honor export agreements as threats to their national security. See Kousky et al., supra
note 27, at 7. See also David D. Zhang et al., Global Climate Change, War, and Population
Decline in Recent Human History, 104 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 19214 (2007) (describing
connections between natural climatic change, crop failures, civic disruption, and war during the
Little Ice Age of the 15th to 19th centuries).
57. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, MONSOON, at xiv, 134–53 (2010) (concluding that “[t]he monsoon
is nature writ large, a spectacle of turbulence that suggests the effect of the environment on
humankind living in increasingly crowded and fragile conditions . . . . America’s ability to grasp
what . . . the monsoon represents . . . will help determine America’s own destiny and that of the
West as a whole”).
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greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide also has a significant effect on the
acidity of the worlds’ oceans. Roughly one third of the carbon dioxide
emitted into the atmosphere dissolves into the oceans, where it reacts
58
with water to form carbonic acid. Whereas the details of climatic
change are so complicated that they challenge even the most powerful
computers, ocean acidification results from very simple and
straightforward chemistry—although the biological response of
59
ecosystems is still rather uncertain. This acidification is likely to
reduce the natural alkalinity of sea water to the point where the
carbonate shells and exoskeletons of corals, shellfish, plankton,
60
urchins, and so on start to dissolve. Disrupting the lowest trophic
levels of ocean ecosystems, such as corals and plankton, can have
dramatic and catastrophic effects on economically valuable
populations of ocean life: the fossil record shows mass extinctions of
sea life that coincide with ocean acidification, but there are too many
61
complicating factors to make clear causal connections. It is clear that
corals and other calcifying species can gradually evolve to survive in
conditions at least as acidic as anthropogenic carbon emissions are
likely to produce, but this evolution takes millions of years and rapid
changes in ocean acidity can drive calcifying organisms to extinction.
Finally, the interactions between ocean acidification and other
anthropogenic stresses are poorly understood and may dramatically
62
amplify the risks.
Although we cannot make certain predictions of the ecological
impacts of CO2 emissions due to ocean acidification, there is a real
prospect of mass extinctions that could cascade through the marine
food web and devastate fisheries, which provide as much as twenty

58. Ocean water is technically slightly alkaline. The acidification due to CO2 emissions is
not expected to turn the water acidic, but because it reduces the alkalinity and brings the water
closer to an acidic state, it is called acidification. See, e.g., Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean
Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV. MARINE SCI. 169, 170 (2009).
59. See, e.g., Quirin Schiermeier, Earth’s Acid Test, 471 NATURE 154 (2011).
60. Doney et al., supra note 58, at 174–78; J.A. KLEYPAS ET AL., IMPACTS OF OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION ON CORAL REEFS AND OTHER MARINE CALCIFIERS: A GUIDE FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
(2006),
available
at
http://www.isse.ucar.edu/florida/report/
Ocean_acidification_res_guide_compressed.pdf.
61. Doney et al., supra note 58, at 183–84; Ken Caldeira, What Corals Are Dying to Tell Us
About CO2 and Ocean Acidification, OCEANOGRAPHY, June 2007, at 188, 188–89; J.E.N. Veron,
Mass Extinctions and Ocean Acidification: Biological Constraints on Geological Dilemmas, 27
CORAL REEFS 459, 469 (2008).
62. See generally Philip W. Boyd, Beyond Ocean Acidification, 4 NATURE GEOSCI. 273
(2011).
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percent of the protein consumed by people worldwide. Beyond their
contribution to food supplies, fisheries provide jobs and economic
activity that are crucial to poor nations, so losing fisheries would add
to economic and political stress arising from climate change. If
combined with a collapse of cereal production, as described above,
64
this loss of fisheries could produce a globally catastrophic famine.
III. A NEW FOCUS ON MACRO-RISKS
How can the risk regulation system be adapted to account for
macro-risks? Rational regulation of macro-risks requires identifying,
assessing, comparing, and communicating information about macrorisks in ways that enable the public and policymakers to engage in
informed, unbiased decision-making about the preferred level and
timing of social investment in risk reduction. Although the same
could be said for micro-risks, the differences between micro- and
macro-risks suggest that different approaches often will be necessary.
We do not offer comprehensive reforms, but we suggest several steps
to improve risk assessment and risk management for climate macrorisks.
A. Macro-Risk Assessment
From our perspective, two options are preferable to risk
assessment approaches that essentially exclude low probability but
catastrophic outcomes: (1) development of modified models that
account for uncertainties about these catastrophic outcomes; or (2) an
expert elicitation to generate subjective judgments that account for
these outcomes. Regardless of the approach taken, we suggest
subjecting the assumptions and outputs of the selected approach to
plausibility assessments by experts in the relevant underlying
disciplines and communicating the outputs of the process in ways that
account for the likely impacts of information on the policy debate.

63. Doney et al., supra note 58, at 179–80, 184; Sarah R. Cooley & Scott C. Doney,
Anticipating Ocean Acidification’s Economic Consequences for Commercial Fisheries, 4 ENVTL.
RES. LETTERS 024007, at 6–7 (2009); R.I. Perry, Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Marine
Wild Capture Fisheries: An Update, 149 J. AGRIC. SCI. 63, 69–70 (2011).
64. Summarizing the prospects for global fisheries, Jeremy Jackson writes, “In light of
everything we know about upheavals in the geological past, another great mass extinction
appears inevitable,” adding that “the question is not whether these trends will happen, but how
fast they will happen, and what will be the consequences for the oceans and humanity.” Jeremy
B.C. Jackson, The Future of Oceans Past, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 3765, 3772
(2010).
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Models that Account for Tail Risks. In developing risk assessment
methods that are appropriate for macro-risks, risk analysts should
avoid the tendency to assume that every problem examined by cost–
benefit analysis is a traditional market failure best addressed by
65
tweaks to the market system. As we discuss above, classical
economics typically deals with externalities as a perturbation on a
fundamentally stable and efficient free market. The public
intervention to address these externalities typically involves making
small corrections to a largely laissez faire system, either by assigning
property rights, pricing the externality, or directly regulating
behavior. With climate change, the externalities become as large as
66
the market system, and this calls for a different paradigm. This
heuristic inference receives rigorous quantitative support from
67
Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem. Although it may be difficult to modify
traditional cost–benefit methods to account for fat tails, a new
generation of research is exploring the consequences of adding
68
explicit treatment of extreme risks in the tails of the distribution.
One response to the concern about the limitations of IAMs is
that cost–benefit analysis is only one of many ways to provide input
into the decision-making process, and if this one does not account for

65. We should not expect rational risk assessment necessarily to translate to low-cost,
moderate-cost, or high-cost risk regulation. If the risk assessment analysis suggests that no
regulation is necessary, then that outcome needs to be reported and given serious weight.
Similarly, if it suggests that major regulatory activity is necessary, even if costly or unpopular,
then that outcome, too, requires airing and serious consideration. See Kousky et al., supra note
27, at 25–27 (commenting on the need for “better understanding of the behavioral and
institutional constraints that must lie behind our failure to pursue seemingly obvious selfinterested actions”). If, instead, it simply suggests that a moderate approach be taken regardless
of the issue, it is not necessarily rational. See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that
the OMB Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon did just this, when it
“adopted ‘political’ solutions, designed to appease all sides, where more difficult technical
decisions were called for”). It is just moderate, which will in some cases be rational and in others
not.
66. See, e.g., Jaeger et al., supra note 32; ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at 160; ULRICH BECK,
RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 19–20 (1992) (noting that the economic paradigm
in which conflict arises dominantly over distribution of scarce goods, which can largely be
treated as economic internalities, is being joined if not replaced by a new paradigm that focuses
on conflict over distributing abundant bads, which are largely externalities).
67. See Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting, supra note 4, at 18.
68. See, e.g., Ackerman et al., supra note 38; Michael D. Gerst et al., Accounting for the
Risk of Extreme Outcomes in an Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, 38 ENERGY POL’Y
4540 (2010); Derek M. Lemoine & Christian Traeger, Tipping Points and Ambiguity in the
Integrated Assessment of Climate Change (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Dep’t Agric. & Resource Econ.
& Policy CUDARE Working Paper No. 1111, 2010), available at http://escholarship.org/
uc/item/9nd591ww.
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plausible catastrophic outcomes, the answer is to simply add other
analyses to the policy mix. But the current policymaking process does
not work this way. Cost–benefit analysis, not any other form of
analysis, is required under the relevant executive orders. In theory,
non-quantified, “soft” assessments can be considered alongside the
69
quantitative outcomes of cost-benefit analysis, but quantitative
outcomes can be expected to dominate non-quantitative outcomes in
70
policy debates.
Expert Elicitation. The use of expert elicitation is a substantial
departure from the dominant approach to micro-risks, but it may
generate a more rational regulatory response for climate change than
a more traditional quantitative approach that does not account for
71
fat-tailed uncertainty. As the debate between Weitzman and his
critics over the proper interpretation of the Dismal Theorem
underscores, a quantitative analysis of fat-tailed climate risks and
policies to address them depends crucially on the value society places
on its continued existence and on the mathematical representation of
the extreme uncertainty regarding threats to its continued existence.
Is the correct net present value for preventing a permanent collapse
simply a multiple of the value of a statistical life, or is the value of
civilization vastly greater than the sum of its parts? Given the scope
both of the risks and of the remedies—mitigation, adaptation, and
geoengineering—that are proposed, it is essential to address squarely
the question of what value to place on the future of civilization. Such
discussion need not focus specifically on the end of civilization, for
the Dismal Theorem implies generally that for any improbable
catastrophe that threatens to significantly disrupt society, fat tailed
uncertainty can cause it to dominate a cost–benefit calculation,
depending on the relationship between the cost of the disruption and
the shape of the tails in the probability distribution. In the face of
69. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 § 1(a); SUNSTEIN, supra note 14,
at 111.
70. See, e.g., Editorial, National Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/opinion/21mon1.html (noting $150 per year cost to
American households of proposed climate legislation but expressing benefits in qualitative
terms).
71. Michael Oppenheimer et al., The Limits of Consensus, 317 SCIENCE 1505, 1505 (2007)
(suggesting that “alternatives to model-based approaches, such as . . . expert elicitation, . . .
certainly would have been useful to policy-makers”). On the use of expert elicitation in
environmental rulemaking, see, for example, SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH 116–18
(1990) (describing controversies over the EPA’s use of expert elicitation in its 1986 revision of
ambient ozone standards), and Sheila Jasanoff, supra note 15, at 36–37 (extending this
discussion to lead and sulfur emissions).
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these types of concerns, a qualitative expert elicitation may lead to a
more rational regulatory response than a quantitative analysis that is
opaque to most policymakers and the public.
The complexity of cost–benefit analysis also can mask other
important value judgments that are particularly important for macrorisks but are embedded in choices about discount rates and other
issues that are largely inaccessible to the public. Even economists
cannot provide a completely coherent or consistent account of intertemporal discounting for macro-risks. In the debate between Stern
and Nordhaus over the ethical foundations of discount rates, each is
able to demonstrate significant inconsistencies in the other’s
treatment of the marginal elasticity of consumption, with the result
that each economist’s choice of discount rate reflects tacit ethical
preferences, and data from actual markets are sufficiently inconsistent
72
that the dispute cannot be resolved empirically. When the issue
being analyzed is a micro-risk problem, this lack of accessibility is
probably a cost worth bearing, given the analytical rigor added to the
regulatory process. When the issue being analyzed is a macro-risk
such as catastrophic climate change, the choice may affect massive
allocations of resources within the current generation and among the
current generation and tens or hundreds of future generations. This
level of opacity may be acceptable for micro-risks, but it is unlikely to
73
yield rational regulatory responses to macro-risks.

72. William Nordhaus, Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change, 317
SCIENCE 201, 202 (2007); Nicholas Stern & Chris Taylor, Climate Change: Risk, Ethics, and the
Stern Review, 317 SCIENCE 203 (2007). Nordhaus points out that Stern’s choice for the elasticity
of the marginal utility of consumption implies taking from the poor in this generation to give to
the rich in future generations while Stern points out that Nordhaus’s preferred value would
imply support for a policy that heavily taxed the rich today, transferred 1 percent of the
proceeds to the poor, and lost or destroyed the other 99 percent. Since both of these
hypothetical programs are prima facie absurd, it is clear that the Ramsey approach to
discounting breaks down for the large time spans involved in macro risks. See also John
Quiggin, Stern and His Critics on Discounting and Climate Change: An Editorial Essay, 89
CLIMATIC CHANGE 195, 198–202 (2008) (demonstrating the connection between disagreements
between Stern and his critics and the widely recognized “equity premium puzzle” of economics
and also observing that actual market pricing of low-risk bonds imply low intertemporal
discounting rates consistent with Stern’s values for pure time preference and elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption).
73. For a review of concerns about the application of standard cost-benefit analysis
techniques to climate change, see Masur & Posner, supra note 7. Ackerman and DeCanio have
observed that mainstream integrated assessment models make assumptions about probability
distributions and economic efficiency that do not reflect the best scientific and empirical
knowledge of the climate system or the state of the economy, and that these assumptions tacitly
bias the models against taking strong action to mitigate climate change. STEPHEN J. DECANIO,
ECONOMIC MODELS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A CRITIQUE 157 (2003); Ackerman et al., supra
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Interdisciplinary Plausibility Assessment. Regardless of the
method chosen, it is important to subject climate and other macrorisk assessments to plausibility assessments by experts in the fields
74
underlying the economic analysis. For example, climate scientists are
better situated than economists to understand the state of the physical
world if temperatures are four degrees Celsius higher. They should be
asked to judge the plausibility of economic models’ assessments of the
economic impacts that will occur at those temperatures. Is it possible
that GDP will only be reduced by one to five percent in a world
marked by a four degree Celsius rise, as the Intergovernmental Panel
75
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the DICE model suggest? It is, but
recent analyses of what conditions will prevail under a four degree
Celsius temperature regime suggest that the economic costs of
adaptation to or enduring such climate change are much more
uncertain and depend much more critically on social and
psychological factors than adaptation to or enduring two degree
76
Celsius warming. Thus, there is a distinct possibility that the IPCC
and the DICE model far underestimate the damage from or cost of
adapting to four degree Celsius warming, and this discrepancy could
grow quickly for warming beyond four degrees Celsius. An
interdisciplinary plausibility analysis would be expensive and timeconsuming, and it is not necessary for run-of-the-mill cost–benefit

note 38, at 1657. DeCanio comments that integrated economic–environmental models have very
poor accuracy at predicting energy demand even a decade or two in the future, in part because
the models incorrectly assume that firms operate at maximum efficiency and also because the
dynamics of technological innovation are too poorly understood to be modeled effectively.
These flaws lead the vast majority of models to grossly overestimate the growth of energy
demand and thus to overstate the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Despite these
known weaknesses, quantitative models tend to dominate policy discussions in part because
their results generate simple, quantitative outcomes that can be widely applied across many
regulatory settings, whereas qualitative analyses are difficult to express and to apply widely.
74. Kousky et al., supra note 27, at 23–27 (calling for a balanced portfolio of
geoengineering, adaptation, and aggressive mitigation; and making decisions based on a
structured consideration of the entire range of expert judgment).
75. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS, AND VULNERABILITY 17 (Martin L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf; NORDHAUS, supra note
35, at 51.
76. See Mark New et al., Four Degrees and Beyond: The Potential for a Global Temperature
Increase of Four Degrees and Its Implications, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 6
(2011); Mark S. Smith et al., Rethinking Adaptation to a 4°C World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC’Y A 196 (2011). For a discussion of the implications of a four degree C warming,
see New, supra, and the articles that follow, all of which are available at http://
rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1934.toc (dedicated issue addressing implications of
global average temperature increase of four degrees C and higher).
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analyses of micro-risk issues, but it is necessary when the assessment
concerns the type of macro-risk issues that have been insufficiently
addressed by the risk regulation process to date.
Communication of Macro-Risk Assessment Information.
Regardless of the risk assessment methods used, risk assessment
results for macro-risks should be communicated in ways that reflect
how information influences policymakers and the public. Unlike
micro-risks, where the issues will often not rise to the level of nonexpert concern, macro-risks by their very nature will more often be
the subject of active public debate and deliberation by policymakers
at the highest levels. Few in the general public likely understand that
the social costs of carbon—or more generally experts’ comfort with
go-slow approaches—are based on models that exclude tail risks and
tipping points, and include discount rates that value continued human
existence in several hundred years at next to nothing. Perhaps
knowing this information would not change near-term risk response
preferences, but not knowing this information certainly can be
expected to make an aggressive response less likely.
The limited treatment of catastrophic harms in IAMs is not the
only example of climate risk assessment and risk communication that
is unlikely to yield rational risk regulation. One response to the
challenges posed by calculating costs and benefits of climate change is
to avoid the need for a cost–benefit analysis by simply selecting a
77
climate change goal and performing a cost effectiveness analysis.
This would simplify the analysis and would avoid the fat tail problem.
The shortcoming of this approach, however, is that it does not
provide guidance on what the climate change goal should be, and it
focuses the public debate on quantitative estimates of the costs of
climate mitigation without comparable estimates of the benefits of
reducing climate harms. A recent example of this phenomenon is the
request by Congress for EPA to prepare a cost-effectiveness analysis
of the Waxman-Markey climate change bill in the House of
78
Representatives. The cost effectiveness analysis provided fodder for
critics of the near-term pecuniary costs of the bill without providing

77. See, e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, Critiquing the Critique of the Climate Change Winner
Argument, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,720, 10,720–22 (2011) (arguing that a cost-effectiveness
analysis, not a cost-benefit analysis, is appropriate for evaluating climate change policy).
78. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY
AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, H.R. 2454 IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 1 (2009), available at http://
www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/HR2454_Analysis.pdf.
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79

comparable information about the benefits, and much of the debate
revolved around the near-term costs, not the underlying reasons for
80
bearing those costs.
Another example of the importance of accounting for public
debates in the communication of climate risk assessment issues is the
treatment of sea level increases in the IPCC 2007 report to
policymakers. The quantitative result in the report for the decade
between 2090 and 2099 was thirty-five centimeters, or about fourteen
inches, as the central estimate, with fifty-nine centimeters, roughly
two feet, in the worst case. The text noted, albeit rather cryptically for
non-experts, that this figure excluded contributions from break-up of
the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets since ice sheet break-up could
81
not be modeled reliably.
This approach may have been true to the best risk assessment
82
methodology, but it was a risk management mistake. A full
understanding of the likely 2100 sea level increase required reading
not only the quantitative figures on page thirteen, but also the
qualitative warning on pages fourteen and seventeen. Skeptics used
the fifty-nine centimeter figure to discredit policy advocates who had
been warning about sea level increases of a meter or more. The
skeptics argued that those policy advocates were alarmists, and that
the IPCC estimate for sea level increases went down, not up, from the
2001 IPCC report—known as AR3—to the 2007 IPCC report—
known as FAR. This left non-skeptics scrambling to note the
qualifying language and unable to attach a quantitative figure to it.

79. The EPA analysis covers costs due to higher energy prices, price changes for other
goods and services, impacts on wages and returns on capital. Id. at 4. It does not account for the
benefits of avoiding the effects of climate change. Id.
80. See, e.g., DAVID KREUTZER, HERITAGE FOUND., HERITAGE ANALYSIS OF WAXMANMARKEY HITS WHERE OTHERS MISS (2009), available at http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2009/08/heritage-analysis-of-waxman-markey-hits-where-others-miss (faulting
EPA for underestimating the costs by making unrealistic assumptions); LAURIER T. JOHNSON,
NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION’S WAXMAN-MARKEY
ANALYSIS, available at http://docs.nrdc.org/globalwarming/files/glo_10042201a.pdf (criticizing
the Heritage Foundation’s cost analysis for making unrealistic assumptions).
81. See IPCC PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 13–17.
82. Oppenheimer, supra note 71, at 1505 (noting that “[t]he emphasis on consensus in
IPCC reports . . . has put the spotlight on expected outcomes. . . . [I]t is now equally important
that policy-makers understand the more extreme possibilities that consensus may exclude or
downplay”). For a discussion of how potential catastrophic events should be discussed in the
next IPCC report, see Socolow, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that the next report of the IPCC
should communicate fully about the state of scientific understanding regarding catastrophic
outcomes).
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Although the IPCC report to policymakers may have taken the
appropriate risk assessment approach, the report, as its name
suggests, is designed to enhance rational risk management by
informing policymakers and the public. It is entirely predictable that
placing a low quantitative estimate in one place and very important
qualifying information elsewhere, in a document explicitly written for
policymakers and in a policy environment in which skeptics are more
than willing to cherry-pick the results, will not generate a complete
policy debate. More recently, Rahmstorf summarized semi-empirical
studies of sea-level rise, which demonstrate the shortcomings of the
IPCC approach: “Since the beginning of satellite measurements, sea
level has risen 80 percent faster . . . than the average IPCC model
83
projection.” Rahmstorf concludes that the most probable value for
sea-level rise by 2095 would be 114 centimeters: seventy-nine
centimeters greater than the IPCC’s central estimate and almost twice
84
the IPCC’s worst-case value. The worst-case reported by Rahmstorf
was close to 200 centimeters, and Rahmstorf emphasized that even
this was likely an underestimate because the semi-empirical models
85
neglected the possibility of nonlinear acceleration of ice-flow.
B. Macro-Risk Management Institutional Arrangements
As difficult as macro-risk assessment may be, macro-risk
management is even more difficult. For catastrophic climate change,
the uncertainty about outcomes and tipping points, the mismatch
between near-term costs and long-term benefits, and the uneven
distribution of costs and benefits among countries and economic
sectors all complicate risk management. We do not offer a complete
solution, but we suggest two measures that will enhance the prospects
that the right people have the necessary information to act.
Identify and Inform the True Gatekeepers. Even the most
accurate and complete macro-risk assessment methods will not lead
to rational risk regulation if they do not affect the actual decisionmakers. To be successful, rational risk regulation for macro-risks
must affect the top decision-makers who not only have the authority
to make decisions at this level, but also to influence public opinion.
We have prepared this Essay for a conference about EPA, and EPA

83. Stefan Rahmstorf, A New View on Sea-Level Rise, 4 NATURE REP. CLIMATE CHANGE
44, 44 (2010).
84. Id. at 45.
85. Id. at 44–45.
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and the other federal environmental agencies—Interior, NOAA,
Agriculture, and Energy, for example—tend to get the blame when
policy fails to match expert perceptions of risk, but, in the final
analysis, macro-risk decisions are not made by EPA or the other
agencies. The EPA administrator and other agency heads have an
effect on macro-risk decisions, but the scale of the resource
allocations, the tremendous political costs of informing the public
about risks that it does not want to hear about, and the cost of
building public support for rational responses to those risks occurs at
the White House and at the highest levels of Congress, if it occurs at
all. Pounding on EPA to do a better job of matching expert and
public perceptions of risk, given the regulatory and resource controls
imposed on the Agency by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), other White House offices, and Congress, reflects a
misperception of the locus of decision-making on climate and other
macro-risks.
Instead, decisions regarding macro-risk are ultimately made by
the president and top congressional leaders with the advice of a very
86
close circle of advisors. Decision-making often does not occur even
among the usual suspects at the White House—the environmental
experts, whether at the Council on Environmental Quality, OIRA, or
other offices established by presidents to address these issues—but
87
rather by the very top political and economic advisors. Given the
near-term costs and long-term benefits of carbon mitigation, it is not
surprising that generalist advisors in Republican and Democratic
administrations have given policy preference to other more
immediate and more politically salient, but ultimately less important,
issues than climate change. A similar phenomenon has occurred at
88
the very top levels of Congress.
From our perspective, rational regulation of macro-risks will only
occur when the generalist advisors closest to the President and the
top leaders of Congress understand the nature of the leading
environmental risks and are induced to recommend adequate
allocations of political capital to address them. That is a tall task, but
we believe it is a mistake to frame the challenge in any other way. An
important starting point is for scholars and policy analysts to focus on

86. See Lizza, supra note 18.
87. Id.
88. Although the U.S. House of Representatives passed a cap-and-trade bill in 2009, the
Senate never brought a bill to the floor. See id.
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how these generalist advisors can be induced to confront information
89
about macro-risks, even if these risks pose a political challenge.
Generate Periodic Macro-Risk Reports. New institutional
mechanisms can be adopted to increase the likelihood that the core
group of influential policymakers confront the hard choices presented
by macro-risks. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, movement in this
direction seemed imminent. Two EPA reports attempted to assess
risks and to induce the White House and Congress to re-allocate
90
resources to the highest risks.
In the Unfinished Business report, prepared at the request of
EPA Administrator Lee Thomas during the second Reagan
Administration, senior EPA staff sought to identify and rank risks in
four categories: cancer, non-cancer health, ecological, and welfare
91
risks. The report noted that EPA’s resources better matched public
perceptions of risk than the perceptions of EPA experts. The
conclusions in the report have withstood the test of time surprisingly
well. For example, the two most substantial ecological and welfare
risks identified in the report were stratospheric ozone depletion and
92
global warming. Global warming also was ranked fifth and
stratospheric ozone depletion sixth on the list of 31 welfare risks
93
evaluated. The 1990 Regulating Risk report by the EPA Science
Advisory Board (SAB) reviewed the Unfinished Business report and
94
largely supported its conclusions. As to climate, EPA and outside
environmental experts thus identified the issue as a high priority
concern as early as the mid- to late-1980s.

89. Kousky et al. recommend also explicitly researching institutional and behavioral
obstacles that have prevented meaningful action thus far. See Kousky et al., supra note 27, at 26.
90. The publication of an annual regulatory plan and semiannual regulatory agenda play
this role for many rulemakings and policy initiatives directed at micro-risks, but they are not
designed to stimulate a broader identification and prioritization of efforts to address macrorisks. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY PLAN AND SEMIANNUAL
REGULATORY AGENDA (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/documents/
regagendabook-fall10.pdf. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) also
requires EPA and other government agencies to link goals more closely with activities and
expenditures, but it does not address prioritization of regulatory resources at the macro-risk
level. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5. U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.).
91. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987).
92. Id. at 48.
93. Id. at 55.
94. SCI. ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAB-EC-90-021, REDUCING RISK:
SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 4 (1990).
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The subsequent climate science has only increased the relative
priority warranted for carbon mitigation, but the preparation of
reports identifying and prioritizing environmental risks has not
continued. Perhaps most important, ground was lost in the response
to the deregulatory momentum of the mid-1990s. For example, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) required the
White House CEQ to prepare annual state of the environment
95
reports to Congress and the President. These reports provided a
starting point for evaluating the allocation of environmental riskreduction resources. Congress enacted the Federal Reports
Elimination and Sunset Act (the Reports Elimination Act) in 1996,
however, and it removed the NEPA report and many other reports
96
from the dozens that agencies were required to submit to Congress.
Rather than viewing the NEPA presidential report requirement as an
independent, viable requirement even after the Reports Elimination
97
Act, CEQ ceased producing the report altogether. The NEPA
report was a vehicle for matching risks to risk reduction resources
that was lost. Ironically, by reducing policymakers’ focus on risk
resource allocation, the loss of the NEPA report ultimately may have
decreased the efficiency and increased the size of regulatory agencies.
To increase the prospects for rational macro-risk management,
the CEQ could revisit its interpretation of NEPA and the Reports
Elimination Act, and could begin again to generate an annual state of
the environment report for the president, even if Congress would
rather not receive the report. Rather than just a summary of the state
of the environment, the report each year could include an explicit
identification and ranking of those risks that pose genuine societallevel threats. Congress could mandate preparation of such a report,
but, even if it does not, there is a good argument that CEQ still has

95. 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1994) (repealed 2000) (requiring President to transmit to Congress
annually an Environmental Quality Report which shall set forth “(1) the status and condition of
the major natural, manmade, or altered environmental classes of the Nation, including, but not
limited to, the air, the aquatic . . . and the terrestrial environment . . . ; (2) current and
foreseeable trends in the quality, management and utilization of such environments”). For a
discussion of this issue, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2085 (2005).
96. See Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 3003(a),
109 Stat. 707, 734. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (2006) (noting termination of section 4341
requirement of annual Environmental Quality Report to Congress).
97. Arguably, a separate provision of NEPA still requires a report to the President. See 42
U.S.C. § 4344(7) (requiring Council “to report at least once each year to the President on the
state and condition of the environment”).
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the authority under NEPA despite the provisions of the Reports
98
Elimination Act.
On a similar note, new legislation or executive branch policy
could require preparation of a “Regulating Risk” report by
government and non-government experts by the end of the first year
99
of each new presidential term. To provide transparency on the
differences between government and non-government experts’
assessment of risks and experts’ versus politicians’ views, the new
approach could require that a version be prepared and made publicly
available by the EPA SAB prior to OMB comment. The report could
then be modified after receipt of comments by the public, OMB,
CEQ, and other White House offices. Making the comments of all of
these entities publicly available would help clarify the varying
perceptions of risks by policymakers who are closer to direct electoral
politics. Both perspectives are valuable, but an unflinching assessment
of risks by experts who are insulated from politics may be necessary
for the democratic process ultimately to yield rational risk
management. If the implications of a risk assessment prevent it from
being made and communicated to the public in an unbiased way at
the outset, the opportunity for democratic debate and decisionmaking may be lost.
IV. CONCLUSION
No one can know whether the financial meltdown of 2008 and
2009 could have been prevented, but it is reasonable to have expected
the top managers and directors of the major corporations that went
bankrupt or survived only because of federal bailouts to have asked
the hard questions when their employees were betting the company
on perpetual growth in housing prices. Top government policymakers
should have asked similar questions. At the very highest levels of

98. Reports that identify important risks are already a part of defense policy debates, and
the Department of Defense discussed climate change in the most recent national security report.
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, at iv (2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf (noting that the
“[r]ising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate
change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic
tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or
exacerbate future conflicts”).
99. For example, although GPRA has pushed agencies in the direction of measuring
performance and aligning performance with congressional directives and micro-risks to some
extent, GPRA has not induced agencies or the political process to better align resource
allocations with macro-risks.
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business and government, someone should have been asking: What
will be the impact of these derivatives if housing prices level off or
decline? Is a leveling off of housing prices impossible or simply an
event that has not occurred in the time horizon included in the risk
assessment models? How much will we lose? If the losses have been
hedged, who are the hedging parties and why do we think they will be
solvent if the economy is in the tank?
We now know that on occasion some individuals raised these
issues. Yet the party continued despite whatever concerns they may
have raised. Perhaps the rewards of ignoring the risk discouraged
many from asking tough questions and enabled those who profited in
the near term to marginalize those who asked tough questions,
whether in board rooms or in government.
The top White House and congressional leaders play a similar
role as to climate change. A rational macro-risk regulation system
should induce these key gatekeepers to ask and to act upon the
answers to questions such as the following: What is the likelihood of
catastrophic climate outcomes? Are there tipping points that might
be passed beyond which emissions reductions will be largely
ineffective? When might they occur? To what extent does the output
of an IAM or the social cost of carbon reflect plausible catastrophic
outcomes? What is the effect on model outputs if climate change
causes negative economic growth? What are the implications of a
range of discount rates for valuing all economic activity in 2100?
2200? 2300? It is reasonable for the public to expect that key
policymakers are asking these types of questions.
Even if the hard questions are asked, it is not possible for the risk
management process to ensure that top policymakers will make
rational and unbiased decisions. But it is essential for the risk
assessment process to provide the information necessary for rational
decision-making to occur. Perhaps one indicator of a society that
responds rationally to risk is that it is able to learn from its mistakes.
To date, the jury is out on whether the next forty years of
environmental policymaking will demonstrate the level of rational
risk regulation concerning macro-risks that we have seen regarding
micro-risks, or whether the climate meltdown will simply mature
more slowly than the financial meltdown.

